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NOTE
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.: International Arbitration
and Antitrust Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is an attractive alternative for parties entering into com-
mercial transactions. Parties to international contracts often include ar-
bitration clauses in an attempt to protect their rights and to eliminate
uncertainties in the event of a dispute. A court may nevertheless treat a
given dispute as nonarbitrable if the issue is highly charged with conflict-
ing public policy concerns.'
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows for the arbitration of
international contract disputes under the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
"Convention") 2 when an agreement between two signatory parties is ca-
pable of arbitration and enforcement is not contrary to the public policy.'
Conflicts have arisen under the Convention with respect to the enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses by signatory countries and the scope of the
"public policy exception."
The United States Supreme Court in the recent landmark decision,
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., held that pri-
vate antitrust claims are arbitrable in a transaction arising in interna-
I Note, Application of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 8 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 194,
197-98 (1984)[hereinafter Note, Application].
2 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
[hereinafter Convention on Recognition].
3 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). For a detailed discussion of the applicability of the Arbitration Act
and the Convention to the Mitsubishi case, see infra text accompanying notes 15-43.
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tional commerce.4 The court ruled in a five-to-three decision that if an
international contract contains a broad arbitration agreement, policy
favoring arbitration overrides the domestic public policy against arbitra-
tion of antitrust claims.5 The majority stated that an arbitration clause
need not specifically mention a given statute in order to require the arbi-
tration of claims arising under the statute.6
This Note will first discuss the background of antitrust claims in the
international context, including the statuatory provisions and treaties in-
volved in such disputes. Second, it will analyze the procedural history of
the Mitsubishi case. The Note will then analyze the Supreme Court's
decision in light of the legislative intent underlying the statutes involved,
previous judicial authority, and alternative public policy concerns. The
Note concludes that the Supreme Court failed to properly evaluate the
countervailing public interest in the nonarbitration of antitrust claims by
holding the Mitsubishi-Soler agreement enforceable.
II. ARBITRATION OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
A. Statutory Provisions and the United Nations Convention
1. Antitrust Laws in the United States
United States antitrust laws are designed to promote the national
interest by outlawing anticompetitive practices. The principle underlying
the antitrust policy is that "the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institution."7 When claims affecting
the public are brought before an arbitrator, competing interests arise. On
a domestic level, federal courts do not permit the arbitration of securities
disputes because waiver of the right to litigate in federal court is not
allowed under the Securities Act of 1933. The courts' rationale is that an
arbitrator cannot be entrusted to preserve investors' rights under the Se-
curities Act.8
The strong public policy behind antitrust regulation raises similar
4 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
5 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 100-15.
6 Id. The "antitrust laws" include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), the Wilson Tariff
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
7 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
8 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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concerns if an antitrust issue is to come before an arbitrator. Antitrust
issues are complicated and the evidence offered is usually substantial. 9
Courts have therefore ruled that judges and juries are better suited than
commercial arbitrators to decide antitrust disputes. Antitrust violations
frequently affect a large segment of the public and may cause great eco-
nomic damage. A private plaintiff bringing an antitrust claim serves as a
private attorney general seeking to protect the public interest."°
The antitrust laws provide an incentive for self-regulation by the
business community in that they provide treble damages and injunctive
relief for successful plaintiffs.I1 Courts have deemed it improper to allow
arbitrators drawn from the business community to make decisions regu-
lating their own behavior. 2 One reason is that it might be difficult to
obtain market share evidence from competitors without the compulsory
discovery procedures afforded by litigation. There also is a strong possi-
bility that contracts generating antitrust disputes may be contracts of ad-
hesion. Such contracts should not determine the forum for trying
antitrust violations between monopolists and their customers. These
considerations militate against contractual agreements to arbitrate. 3
The Federal Arbitration Act did not signal a change in policy with
respect to the arbitration of antitrust disputes. In subscribing to the Con-
vention in 1970, Congress did not controvert the principles of domestic
antitrust policy. 4
2. The United Nations Convention
Foreign arbitral awards were traditionally enforced in accordance
with the domestic law of the jurisdiction of enforcement.' 5 The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards was intended to alleviate the often irregular results of a
system lacking uniform standards for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
The United States became a signatory to the Convention in 1970.16
This action was taken in response to the widespread inclusion of arbitra-
9 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 Id. at 827.
11! 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 16.
12 American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827.
13 Id. For a detailed discussion of policy concerns disfavoring automatic forum determination,
see infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
14 See Brief for the United States asAmicus Curiae, Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3346 (1985).
15 Note, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-The United Nations Convention of the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 218
(1984)[hereinafter Note, Enforcement].
16 Convention on the Recognition, supra note 2. The United States did not accede to the Con-
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tion clauses as standard dispute resolution mechanisms in international
commercial contracts.1 7 Chapter 2 of the Arbitration Act, which ex-
pressly implements the Convention, became effective the same year.'
8
The goal of the Convention is to encourage the recognition and enforce-
ment of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts
and to "unify the standard by which the agreements to arbitrate are ob-
served and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries." 19
Congress made explicit that the Act renounces courts' traditional hesi-
tancy to bind parties to contractual arbitration agreements.2" The Con-
vention regulates two phases of the arbitration procedure: the
determination that an agreement is legally binding and the enforcement
of the arbitral award.21 The Convention applies both to the administra-
tion of "awards made in the territory of a State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such claims are sought" and to
awards "not considered as domestic awards in the State where their rec-
ognition and enforcement is sought."22
The Convention provides exceptions to the enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses in international commercial contracts. Under Article II(1),
each contracting state must recognize an agreement concerning a subject
matter "capable of settlement by arbitration."23 Article II(3) excludes
agreements which the courts determine to be "null and void, inoperative,
or incapable of being performed." 24 Most controversial is Article V(2),
under which the Convention allows a court to refuse recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award if: "(a) The subject matter of the differ-
ence is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
vention subsequent to the 1958 negotiations, in which it did participate, because the agreement was
not compatible with United States law. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
17 Note, Transnational Claims are Nonarbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act and Article
11(1) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 743 (1984)[hereinafter Note, Transnational].
18 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
19 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.10, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974).
20 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238,1242 (1985).
21 Contini, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tralAwards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 286 (1959).
22 Convention on Recognition, art. I, I.
23 Convention on Recognition, art. 11, 1, provides in pertinent part:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties under-
take to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise be-
tween them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
24 Convention on Recognition, art. II, 3, provides in pertinent part:
The Court of a Contracting State when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which...
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this ... article, shall at the request of
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.
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country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country." 5 Consequently, under
the Convention, the party against whom an award is sought to be en-
forced bears the burden of proof.
2 6
In the past, the exceptions to arbitration provided in the treaty have
been narrowly interpreted to preserve the principles and purposes of the
Convention. United States courts have not set forth the meaning of Arti-
cle II(1) and have ruled only on whether a given claim is encompassed by
an arbitration clause. 27 The inclusion of Article II(1) is intended to pre-
vent a court from refusing to enforce an arbitral award by deeming inva-
lid the agreement on which the award was based and thereby
contravening the aims of the Convention. 8
The members of the conference concluded that the court of enforce-
ment should have power to decide whether compulsory execution of an
award would be adverse to public policy or whether a dispute could be
resolved under domestic laws by arbitration. 9 United States courts have
interpreted the public policy defense narrowly, however, applying it only
to contracts involving fraud, mistake or duress-standards that may be
applied neutrally to render an international contract void.3" In fact, the
public policy defense has been allowed by the courts in only three or four
cases out of approximately 100 internationally reported cases governed
by the Convention.3" Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has disallowed
arbitration under Article II by extending a judicially-created exception to
arbitrability to international contracts. 2
3. The Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act marked the beginning of a national
25 Convention on Recognition, art. V, 2(a)-(b), provides in pertinent part:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent author-
ity in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject mat-
ter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.
26 Under the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927,
92 L.N.T.S. 157, the plaintiff in the enforcement proceeding had the burden to show that the condi-
tions for enforcing an award had been fulfilled. The Convention on Recognition in this and other
ways liberalizes the enforcement conditions of the Geneva Convention. Contini, supra note 21, at
299.
27 Note, Transnational, supra note 17, at 747 n.30.
28 Id.
29 Contini, supra note 21, at 304.
30 Note, Transnational, supra note 17, at 745-46 n.28 (citing Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684
F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982)).
31 Note, Transnational, supra note 17, at 745 n.24.
32 Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S.Ct. 3346.
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policy favoring arbitration.33 The language of the statute and judicial
implementation of its provisions reflect that the United States position
favoring commercial arbitration is among the strongest and most clearly-
expressed public policies of this century.34 The Act declares that parties
to a transaction shall be bound to agreements submitting disputes to arbi-
tration and that judicial review of arbitral awards will be limited.35 The
Act provides that a stay of litigation will be ordered concerning any issue
within the scope of the arbitration clause and provides for specific per-
formance of arbitration upon request of either party.
3 6
The Federal Arbitration Act implements the United Nations Con-
vention.37 Chapter 2 of Title 9 addresses the Convention and Congress'
enabling legislation. Section 201 provides for enforcement of the Con-
vention by United States courts.38 The body of the Convention resembles
the Federal Arbitration Act, and all of the Convention is incorporated
into Chapter 1 of Title 9.39 Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act applies to
proceedings brought under the 1970 legislation to the extent that Chap-
ter 1 does not conflict with Chapter 2 or the Convention as ratified by the
United States.'
The Convention orders United States courts to enforce arbitration
clauses in accordance with procedures similar to those stipulated in the
Arbitration Act. The Convention provides courts with great latitude.
Both the Act and the Convention provide that if a dispute is subject to
arbitration, the district court "shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration" when the site for arbitration is within the dis-
trict.4 ' Section 206 further empowers district courts to direct parties to
proceed to arbitration under the Convention even outside the United
States.42 However, "[s]ince there may be circumstances in which it
would be highly desirable to direct arbitration within the district in
which the action is brought and inappropriate to direct arbitration
abroad § 206 is permissive rather than mandatory."43
33 Ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)(current version at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). See also H.R. REP.
No. 96, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
34 Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommoda-
tion of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N. CAR. L. REv. 219, 231 (1986).
35 9 U.S.C. §§ 2,3.
36 9 U.S.C. § 4.
37 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
38 9 U.S.C. § 201.
39 9 U.S.C. § 208.
40 See Mirabito, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 471, 492 (1975).
41 9 U.S.C. § 4.
42 9 U.S.C. § 206.
43 See H.R. REP. No. 1181, supra note 16.
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B. Previous Attempts at Arbitration
District courts have enforced arbitration clauses except in those lim-
ited areas affecting the public interest, particularly the securities'and an-
titrust laws." If a party alleges several causes of action, one of which
falls within what Congress has deemed to be the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts, then the entire dispute must remain in federal court
despite the existence of an arbitration clause.45
The validity of arbitration clauses in domestic contracts has been
explored by United States district courts in several major cases. (The
Supreme Court had not confronted the antitrust exception in either an
international or domestic context before Mitsubishi.)46 The judicially-
created antitrust exception to arbitrability was first established by the
Second Circuit decision in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co. I This case analyzed the policy considerations present in
arbitrating a domestic antitrust claim. The court held that a claim of a
trademark licensee alleging violations of the Sherman Act by a United
States company was inappropriate for arbitration.48 The Second Circuit
ruled that antitrust matters were far too important to the nation's public
policy to allow their disposition by arbitration.49 The court cited the
potential complexity of antitrust claims and questioned the propriety of
entrusting antitrust matters to commercial arbitrators drawn from the
business community.5
The American Safety court recognized the inherent conflicts of in-
terest in allowing arbitrators from the business community to enforce
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion between monopolists and
their customers. Federal law must protect the party situated in an infer-
ior bargaining position. 1 The American Safety decision had its basis in
Wilko v. Swan,52 which held that an arbitration clause could not deprive
44 See Tai Ping Insurance Co. v. M/V Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1984).
45 Id.
46 Note, Arbitrability and Antitrust: Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 23 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 665 n.59 (1985).
47 American Safety, 391 F.2d 821.
48 Id. at 828.
49 Id. at 826.
50 Id. at 827.
51 Id.
52 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427. The American Safety court analogized the Wilko case as a "similar
collision of public policies." American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826. However, antitrust claims differ
from securities claims because the development of a nonarbitrability rule for security claims was
based on a specific statutory nonwaiver provision. Although the Sherman Act does not render void
any waiver of a party's right to sue in federal court, both policies are based on the public interest
nature of the laws. See generally Symposium on Antitrust and Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1069
(1969).
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a securities buyer of remedies under the Securities Act. The Second Cir-
cuit's holding that arbitration of antitrust claims may not be compelled
has been adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.
53
The courts have also spoken on arbitration agreements in securities
transactions. Wilko v. Swan involved a domestic securities customer's
suit against a brokerage firm for alleged misrepresentation under the Se-
curities Act of 1933. Although the sales agreement provided for arbitra-
tion, the Supreme Court held that arbitration of a securities claim could
not be compelled under the Federal Arbitration Act.5 4 Section 14 of the
Act forbids parties from waiving compliance with any provision of the
Act through a provision in their private contract. The Court interpreted
the arbitration agreement as a stipulation waiving the purchaser's right
to bring suit in federal court under another section of the Act.:5 The
Court recognized that the provisions of the Securities Act would have
been applied in any arbitration of the claim, but ruled that arbitration
would not ensure that investors' rights were protected-a concern vital
to the public interest. Moreover, arbitration would not provide the op-
portunity for a reviewing court to vacate the arbitration award, a protec-
tion required by the Securities Act. 6 Wilko was the controlling case for
purely domestic transactions in the federal courts prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Mitsubishi.5 7
Although the United States Supreme Court had not spoken explic-
itly on the issue of arbitrability of international antitrust claims prior to
Mitsubishi, the Court had remarked upon the Convention in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.58 This case involved a United States corporation with
operations in the United States and abroad, which acquired the stock of
three German manufacturing companies.5 9 The negotiations, signing of
the sales contract, and closing had taken place in Europe. The written
contract between a United States company and a German citizen pro-
vided for arbitration of any dispute in Paris.6" The plaintiff subsequently
discovered that critical trademarks, which the defendant had represented
as unencumbered, were substantially encumbered. The plaintiff brought
suit in federal court, alleging that defendant had misrepresented the sta-
53 Allison, supra note 34, at 236.
54 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434, 435, 437.
55 Id. at 434-35.
56 Id. at 435-36.
57 Allison, supra note 34, at 234.
58 Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.
59 Id. at 506.
60 Id. at 508.
Mitsubishi Motors
7:595(1986)
tus of the trademarks in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.61 A clause in the contract provided for arbitration of "any contro-
versy or claim . . .[that] shall arise out of this agreement or a breach
thereof."62 Relying on Wilko v. Swan, the defendant claimed that such a
clause was inapplicable to its securities claim. The Court of Appeals in
Scherk had relied on Wilko as authority rendering any arbitration clause
unenforceable against a claim based on United States securities laws.63
The Supreme Court's decision in Scherk limited the Wilko holding.
The Court found crucial differences between the Wilko agreement and
the one in Scherk, resulting in different policy considerations. The
Scherk facts raised important international business concerns.64 The
Supreme Court distinguished the Wilko holding because it arose in a
purely domestic context in which United States laws would undoubtedly
apply. In international transactions, however, an arbitration clause pro-
motes orderliness and predictability by establishing in the agreement the
law to be applied in the resolution of any controversy. The Court found
the arbitration clause to be a specialized kind of forum selection clause,
an "almost indispensible precondition" to international contracts.65
Moreover, repudiation of an international arbitration agreement
would constitute a parochial exercise of United States domestic policy in
an international forum.6 6 The Court noted that arguments against al-
lowing a purchaser of securities to waive his or her right to sue in federal
court, relied upon in Wilko, were inapplicable to Scherk because claims
of a buyer's choice of forum become merely "chimerical" in international
situations in which a party can seek an order in a foreign court enjoining
litigation in the United States. 67 The Court in Scherk did not reach a
decision under the United Nations Convention. Instead, the Scherk
panel enforced its award under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act which apply solely to domestic awards. 68 The Court did, however,
cite to Article II(1) and to the United States' adoption and implementa-
tion of the Convention in support of the Court's decision to enforce arbi-
tral awards.69 The Scherk decision did not directly address the issue of
whether awards rendered in the United States are enforceable in the
61 Id. at 508-09.
62 Id. at 508.
63 Id. at 510.
64 Id. at 515.
65 Id. at 516.
66 Id. at 519.
67 Id. at 517-18.
68 Id. at 520.
69 Id. at 520 n.15.
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United States under the Convention.7 °
The Scherk decision demonstrated that domestic policy concerns
may become moot in an international context. The Scherk court bal-
anced the demand for predictability in international contracts against the
compelling necessity of protecting the securities markets and decided
that the Wilko policy should not extend to international securities
claims.7t
III. THE MITSUBISHI DECISION
A. Factual Background
Petitioner and cross-respondent Mitsubishi Motors ("Mitsubishi"),
a Japanese corporation and manufacturer of automobiles, was the result
of a joint venture between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., another
Japanese corporation, and Chrysler International, S.A. ("CISA"), a
Swiss corporation wholly owned by the Chrysler Corporation. 72 The
purpose of the joint venture was the distribution outside the continental
United States through Chrysler of vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi
and bearing Chrysler and Mitsubishi trademarks. Respondent and cross-
petitioner Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ("Soler") was a Puerto Rican
corporation which had its principal place of business in Puerto Rico.
Soler entered into a distribution agreement with CISA for the sale in
Puerto Rico of automobiles manufactured by Mitsubishi and into a sales
procedure agreement with both Mitsubishi and CISA.73 The contract
called for arbitration of any future disputes in Japan under the rules of
the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association.74
When the new-car market slackened, Soler encountered difficulties
in meeting the expected sales volume and requested that Mitsubishi delay
or cancel the scheduled shipment of orders. 75 Mitsubishi and CISA re-
fused permission.76 Soler also requested permission for transshipment of
some of the vehicles to the continental United States and Latin America.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 519-20.
72 Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3347.
73 Id.
74 Id. In the words of the Supreme Court:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out
of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be




76 The reasons advanced included concerns that such diversion would interfere with the Japa-
nese policy of voluntarily limiting imports to the United States-that the Soler-ordered vehicles
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This was also refused. 77 Attempts to resolve these difficulties failed.
78
Mitsubishi commenced an action against Soler in March 1982 in
federal district court under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.79
Mitsubishi alleged breach of contract and sought to compel arbitration
under the sales agreement. 0 Mitsubishi also "filed a request for arbitra-
tion before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association."81 "Soler de-
nied the allegations and counterclaimed against Mitsubishi and CISA,"
under the Sherman Act and federal and Puerto Rican dealers' contract
statutes. 82 Finally, Soler claimed that Mitsubishi and CISA had con-
spired to divide the markets in restraint of trade.83
B. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
ordered arbitration of the dispute, holding that Soler's Sherman Act anti-
trust claim fell within the parties' agreement. 84 While recognizing that
domestic antitrust issues are not meant to be arbitrated, the court ruled
that the international nature of the contract brought overiding policy
concerns into play.8 ' The court, citing Scherk, reasoned that the con-
tractual relationship between Mitsubishi and Soler was truly interna-
tional in character and that the Arbitration Act mandated arbitration
between the parties.86 The court applied the language of Article H1(3) of
the Convention to find that the agreement was not "null and void, inop-
erative or incapable of being performed," and consequently removable
would be unsuitable for use in certain proposed destinations because of their manufacture (without
heaters and defoggers, lack of high octane fuel in Puerto Rico, etc.) Id. at 3349-50.





82 Soler alleged numerous breaches by Mitsubishi of the sales agreement, including "wrongful
refusal to ship ordered vehicles and parts, failure to make payment for warranty work and author-
ized rebates, and bad faith in establishing minimum sales volumes." Soler made two defamation
claims, and asserted causes of action under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, the federal Automo-
bile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 70 Stat. 1125, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1221-25, the Puerto Rican
competition statute, P.R. Laws Ann., Tit 10, §§ 257-76 (1978 & Supp. 1983). Mitsubishi Motors, 105
S. Ct. at 3350.
83 Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3350.
84 Note, Application, supra note 1, at 207 n.92 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., No. 82-538, 10-11 (D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982)(order compelling arbitration)).
85 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 723 F.2d at 158.
86 Note, Application, supra note 1, at 208 nn. 95-96 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, No. 82-538 at 9-
11).
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from arbitration.8 7 The court dismissed Soler's claims raised under Pu-
erto Rican law, finding that the Arbitration Act preempted the applica-
bility of the Puerto Rican law to the dispute.8
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's opinion in part,
finding that the antitrust counterclaims were not arbitrable as a matter of
law.8 9 The court ruled that neither the United Nations Convention nor
prior case law required the United States to overlook its own domestic
policy and order arbitration.90 The court applied the American Safety
doctrine and held that arbitration was an inappropriate mechanism for
the resolution of antitrust claims. 91
The court held that the antitrust exception was arbitrable under Ar-
ticle II(1) of the Convention rather than nonarbitrable under Article
II(3).92 The court reasoned that the inclusion of Article II(1) apart from
Article HI(3) indicated an intent on the part of the drafters to allow exclu-
sion of a claim from arbitration when important domestic policy issues
are involved. 93 The court distinguished Scherk as that case had not ana-
lyzed the language of the Convention. 94 The court found a further dis-
tinction in the manner in which the securities and antitrust laws affect
the public.9" The court reasoned that, because many nations support do-
mestic antitrust policies, the United States imposition of the American
Safety doctrine was not improper.96 Moreover, a refusal to enforce do-
mestic antitrust laws in the international context would frustrate United
States domestic policy.
97
The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings
to determine whether the antitrust issues "permeated" the contractual
disputes or whether bifurcation was appropriate.98 The district court
was also to decide how parallel actions would proceed; if the lower court
found that arbitration would proceed first, the court would have no need
87 Id. at 6-7.
88 Id.
89 Mitsubishi Motors, 723 F.2d at 163.
90 Id. at 163-64, 166.
91 Id. at 168-69.
92 Id. at 164.
93 Id. at 164-68.
94 Id. at 167.
95 Id. at 168.
96 Id. at 163.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 169.
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to reach the antitrust issue.99
D. The Supreme Court Decision
Both parties appealed the First Circuit's decision. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari "primarily to consider whether
an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust
claims by arbitration when that agreement arises out of an international
transaction.""°
Several parties filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court.
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") argued that accepting
antitrust claims from international arbitration "injects substantial uncer-
tainty into the process to the detriment of United States trading inter-
ests." 10 1 The AAA pointed out that the nonarbitrability of antitrust
disputes was "without support in the legislative history of the U.N. Con-
vention and its implementing decisions or in the decisions of Court," and
that arbitration would not endanger the United States' competitive econ-
omy.102 The International Chamber of Commerce also filed a brief in
favor of international arbitration of antitrust claims.10 3 In contrast, the
brief for the United States argued that Congress never indicated its intent
that antitrust disputes be settled by arbitration."
The Court first ruled that the broad arbitration clause encompassed
the antitrust dispute. Although the arbitration clause in the contract did
not specifically mention the statute giving rise to the claim, the Court
held there is "no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims."' 1 5 The Court further stated that, as with any other contract, the
parties' intentions control, but that those intentions are to be generously
construed as to issues of arbitrability.'06
99 Id.
100 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353 (1985).
101 Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae, at 20, Mitsubishi Motors,
105 S. Ct. at 3346.
102 Id.
103 See generally Brief for the International Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae, at 25,
Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3346.
104 Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae, at 21, Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3346.
105 Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3353.
106 Id. at 3354. This is a question of presumption as the Congress' recognition of the status of
antitrust arbitrability at the time of the Federal Arbitration Act. Although it appears that before
acceding to the Convention the Senate was advised by a State Department Memorandum that the
Convention provided for exceptions to arbitrability grounded in domestic law, see S. Exec. Doe. E,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), in implementing the Convention by amendment to the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, Congress did not specify any matters it intended to exclude from its scope. See Mitsubishi
Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3360 n.21.
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The Court then addressed the issue of whether Soler's antitrust
claims were nonarbitrable, even though the parties had agreed to arbitra-
tion. The Court found it "unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the
American Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising
from domestic transactions."1 7 The Court reasoned that the policy
questions brought out in the American Safety doctrine did not apply to
international disputes. The Court held that there is no basis for assum-
ing that the arbitration forum would be inadequate or its selection unfair.
The Court pointed out that complexity alone should not lead to the con-
clusion that a decision by an arbitral panel will constitute a threat to the
constraints on business conduct already imposed by antitrust laws.
10 8
The Court then examined the main tenet of the American Safety
doctrine-"the fundamental importance to American democratic capi-
talism of the regime of the antitrust laws." 10 9 The Court's logic centered
around the fact that antitrust laws protect the interest of the public, not
the private party, and that provisions for damages are important as a
deterrent to violators and to preserve the competitive economy. The
Supreme Court held that the importance of the private damages remedy
does not compel the conclusion that such a remedy may not be sought
outside a United States court.' 10 A prospective litigant may provide for a
mutually agreeable procedure in advance whereby the party would seek
an antitrust recovery if the international cast of a problem would lead to
uncertainty in dispute resolution.111
The Court's decision stated that, when parties have agreed to decide
a set of claims by an arbitral body, the tribunal should be bound to de-
cide that dispute in accordance with the national law giving rise to that
claim. United States courts would have the opportunity to protect the
public policy interests when reviewing the award at the enforcement
stage. 112 The Convention reserves to each country the right to refuse
enforcement of an award if the recognition or enforcement of that award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.'
13
Finally, the Court stated that it was necessary for federal courts to
subordinate domestic notionls of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring arbitration if the international tribunals were ever to be tested so
107 Id. at 3355.
108 Id. at 3357-58.
109 Id. at 3357. ("The mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant invalida-
tion of the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted.")
110 Id. at 3358.
111 Id. at 3359. See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
112 Id. at 3359-60.
113 Id. at 3360.
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as to take their place in the international legal order.114 Thus, "concerns
for international comity, respect for the capacity of international tribu-
nals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system
for predictability in the resolution of disputes" required enforcement of
the agreement, "even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcom-
ing in a domestic context."11 5
The dissent disagreed with the majority opinion on several issues.
First, the dissent stated that the arbitration clause did not encompass the
claim. The dissenting justices reasoned that the clause applied only to
two-party disputes between Soler and Mitsubishi and that the antitrust
violation alleged in Soler's counterclaim was a three-party suit.1 1 6 Also,
the clause applied only to disputes relating to five out of a total of fifteen
articles in the sales procedure agreement. Here, the dissent construed the
arbitration clause narrowly. An arbitration clause, Justice Stevens
stated, cannot be construed to cover a statuatory remedy that it does not
expressly identify.117
In a second area, the dissent stated that Congress did not intend § 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act to apply to antitrust claims. The dissent-
ing justices found nothing in the text of the Act nor in its legislative
history to support such an application. 8 The dissent declared that Con-
gress did not intend the Convention to apply to disputes that are not
arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The opinion went on to
cite the public policy defense in the Convention and summed up that: "it
is equally unwise to allow a vision of world unity to distort the impor-
tance of the selection of the proper forum for resolving this dispute."
'1 19
The dissent also refuted the majority's statement that the statutory
remedies fashioned by Congress for the enforcement of the antitrust laws
will provide adequate review of arbitrators' decisions. As arbitration
awards may only be reviewed for manifest disregard of the law, and the
record is often inadequate for appellate review, the dissent found this
safeguard to be insufficient.12
Finally, the dissent criticized the Court's "obtuse application" of
114 Id.
115 Id. at 3355.
116 Id. at 3363. ("Only by stretching the language of the arbitration clause far beyond its ordi-
nary meaning could one possibly conclude that it encompasses this three-party suit.")
117 Id. at 3362-63.
118 Id. at 3364. Again, this is a question of presumption which should be resolved according to
policy dictates and the congressional intent at the time of enactment. See supra note 103 and accom-
panying text.
119 Id. at 3374.
120 Id. at 3370.
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Scherk. 2 ' The dissenters stated that the logic the Supreme Court ap-
plied in Scherk, by distinguishing Wilko, also applied in Mitsubishi: there
was no credible claim that any international conflicts of law problems
would arise. 22 The dissenting opinion stated that it was perfectly clear
that the rules of United States antitrust law must govern the contention
that a United States auto dealer had been injured by an international
conspiricy to restrain trade in the United States automobile market.1 23
The dissenting justices found the reasoning in Scherk to be wholly inap-
plicable to Soler's claims because the merits of Soler's claims were con-
trolled entirely by United States law. "When Mitsubishi enters the
American market and plans to engage in business over a period of years,
it must recognize its obligation to comply with American law and to be
subject to the remedial provisions of American statutes."' 124 "The fraud
claimed in Scherk was virtually identical to the breach of warranty claim
[in Mitsubishi]; arbitration of such claims arising out of an agreement
between parties of equal bargaining strength does not conflict with any
significant federal policy.' 25 The dissent noted that Soler's claim impli-
cated fundamental antitrust policies and should be evaluated in light of
an explicit congressional finding concerning the disparity in bargaining
power between automobile manufacturers and their franchised dealers.
The opinion cited the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act as evidence
of the federal government's interest in protecting automobile dealers
from overreaching by car manufacturers. 126 For these reasons, the dis-
senting opinion recognized that "international arbitration will only suc-
ceed if it is realistically limited to tasks it is capable of performing
well.... [E]ven the [multinational] Convention recognizes that private
international arbitration is incapable of achieving satisfactory results
when matters involve the political passions and the fundamental interests
of nations."' 27
IV. MITSUBISHI AND ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
A. Support for the Nonarbitration of International Antitrust Claims
The history of the Federal Arbitration Act and the purposes of the
121 Id. at 3372.
122 Id. at 3373.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 3374.




United States Convention support the dissent's view that the antitrust
issue in Mitsubishi should not have been resolved by arbitration. There
exists a minimum of legislative history on the Convention, none of which
is dispositive of any interpretation of the public policy considerations of
Articles II and V. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court
attempted to analyze this history in reaching a decision in the Mitsubishi
case.128 The language of the Convention and its expressed purpose, how-
ever, lead to a logical conclusion as to the intentions of Congress.
If all antitrust claims arising from international contracts were
found to be arbitrable, the Convention's language, "not capable of settle-
ment by arbitration," would have little or no meaning. In deciding
whether a matter is capable of settlement by arbitration, a court may
apply federal law, choice-of-law rules, or, where recognition and enforce-
ment of an award is sought, the law that would govern under Article V
of the Convention.129 The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi attempted to
interpret Article V of the Convention.
There are two interpretations of the exceptions clauses to the Con-
vention. One is that the policy concerns of Article V apply when deter-
mining whether an agreement is "null and void" or "capable of
settlement by arbitration." 3° The second is that considerations of do-
mestic public policy are to be taken into account only in the decision as
to whether an arbitral award should be enforced. The Supreme Court
reasoned that having ordered arbitration (under Article II), United
States courts could have the opportunity at the enforcement stage to re-
fuse to honor that decision. The Court's decision thus defers to judicial
review of the award.131
Such a ruling by the Court, however, reduces the predictability of
international transactions because a party will not know if its arbitration
attempt was successful until the party attempts to enforce the agreement.
In some cases, of course, such an approach would avoid the problem of a
court's hostility to arbitration because the court would never reach the
issue of the intertwining doctrine.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in interpreting the Convention,
the clear language of the treaty should control unless the result is incon-
sistent with the intent of the signatories.132 The public policy defense
128 723 F.2d at 164.
129 See Note, Application, supra note 1, at 219.
130 See id. at 220 n.179, for a history of the Court's treatment of "null and void."
131 Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
132 See Note, Application, supra note 1, at 223 n.189 (citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)).
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was originally interpreted to be quite broad.1 33 Thus, the Court should
analyze the words of the Convention and its implementing legislation.
Such an analysis should clearly lead to the result that the claim need not
be arbitrated under the Convention.
The Court ruled that having made the bargain to arbitrate, a party
should be held to that bargain unless Congress has evinced an intention
otherwise. However, the congressional intent for removing antitrust
claims from arbitration is present in the public policy exception to the
Convention. Few policies are more clearly established than the impor-
tance of the antitrust regulations to the United States economy. The
Court, instead, relied on the judicial doctrine of American Safety and
subsequent cases.
Even under a very narrow interpretation of Article II (calling for
the enforcement of all arbitration agreements), a court would have to
refuse to enforce the award under Article V. There is no need for a court
to take the extra step. Congress can be presumed to have passed the
Arbitration Act with the exclusion of antitrust claims in mind because
the policy against arbitration of such claims has been well established by
the courts.'3 4 Arbitration of antitrust claims should be allowed only if
Congress so declares. The dissenting opinion reaffirms that the federal
legislature has recognized the problems which arise when arbitration
clauses are enforced in commercial contracts, not the least of which is the
danger of the courts enforcing a contract of adhesion. 35
Thus, the language of the Convention and the policy underlying the
Federal Arbitration Act provide that the public policy exception applies
to antitrust claims in the Mitsubishi-Soler dispute.
B. Precedent and Public Policy
The conclusion in the Mitsubishi case, that an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising from the sales agreement includes claims of restraint of
trade by the manufacturer, is unfounded. 136 A concern which has been
stressed in American Safety and subsequent decisions is that unconscion-
able contracts should not determine the forum for the trial of antitrust
violations. 137 An agreement to arbitrate claims arising from a sales con-
tract cannot be read to encompass claims that the contract itself was in
restraint of trade.
133 Note, Application, supra note 1 at 221 n.184.
134 See American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827-28.
135 See Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
136 Id. at 3363.
137 American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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The Scherk doctrine was rightly rejected by the Court of Appeals.
First, the Scherk case dealt with a securities claim. Public policy is of
greater concern in antitrust claims because such claims affect a larger
segment of the public, not only the purchasers of stock.1 38 Moreover, the
contract agreement in Scherk was far more international in character
than the sales agreement in Mitsubishi, implicating different policy
concerns. 
139
Prior case law also recognizes the policy concerns that demand
claims, such as those in Mitsubishi, not be arbitrated. The American
Safety doctrine embodies policy questions that apply to international as
well as domestic disputes. 4 ° Certainly there are some policy concerns
against arbitration that are even stronger in the international context. 141
The United States cannot forego regulation of its free market economy to
promote "international comity."14 As the Court of Appeals pointed
out, other countries are aware of the primacy which the United States
accords to its antitrust law. Moreover, antitrust laws are common else-
where.43 Signatories would expect the United States to protect its eco-
nomic interests; impositions of domestic policy would not be parochial in
this instance. 1" The Mitsubishi conflict is a rare example of a dispute in
which the public policy defense was meant to be employed.
C. Policy Considerations
The arbitration of antitrust claims would be undesirable as a matter
of policy. Antitrust claims are often frivolous, raised in an attempt to
remove a dispute to a more favorable forum. Parties may attempt to
delay or avoid arbitration by asserting restraint of trade claims. 145
Moreover, it is well known that antitrust claims often concern com-
plex economic issues which require the type of compulsory discovery
procedures assured by a judicial trial. The judicial trial would also pro-
vide a written opinion and detailed findings of fact necessary for possible
138 See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text. Those who argue that the 1933 and 1934 Acts
improve integrity of markets might disagree.
139 Mitsubishi Motors, 723 F.2d at 167.
140 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
142 Id.
143 See Mitsubishi Motors, 723 F.2d at 163; Hoellering, Mitsubishi: Arbitrability and Antitrust
Claims, 194 N.Y.L.J. 1, 2 (Aug. 18, 1985).
144 See Mitsubishi Motors, 723 F.2d at 163; Hoellering, supra note 143, at 2.
145 Id. This concern may seem to militate toward increased arbitrability by reasoning that, if
antitrust claims were arbitrable, then parties could not use them as removal devices. However,
courts could eliminate this concern by ascertaining whether the antitrust claims were bona fide or
frivolous in deciding whether to order arbitration.
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review.'4 6 The Mitsubishi Court's deference to judicial review of the
award provides inadequate protection of the important interests in-
volved. The interest of maintaining economic competition is jeopardized
when the judiciary does not retain jurisdiction over antitrust disputes.
Placing power in the hands of arbitrators not restrained by formal legal
procedures in their decisionmaking is inappropriate.
If antitrust claims were to be sent to arbitration, it would be impera-
tive that sophisticated, trustworthy, and predictable arbitrators be
found.147 Judicial supervision and the legal authority to provide for such
selection would be necessary. 148 However, arbitrators are often chosen
for their commercial expertise, and they are not required to follow perti-
nent legal rules. The competency of arbitrators is a vital concern. When
an antitrust claim is prosecuted, the decision will have a considerable
impact on the general public and not only the parties to the instant
case. 149
The Mitsubishi decision has far-reaching effects. The implications
for international business as well as domestic arbitration are considera-
ble. Mitsubishi does not hold that arbitral tribunals are inherently capa-
ble of deciding antitrust disputes, but affirms that these bodies are not
inherently incapable. Arbitration of the Mitsubishi dispute and other in-
ternational antitrust claims might make the laws of certain jurisdictions
more predictable and thus more attractive to international trade. How-
ever, allowing the arbitration of claims that go against United States pub-
lic policy would make the United States the most progressive nation in
this regard. 50 Such a change would threaten the existing competitive
economic structure. The Supreme Court based the support for its deci-
sion to arbitrate the Mitsubishi antitrust claim on the fact that interna-
tional tribunals have not yet been tested and cannot be assumed to be
incapable of handling the matter. 151 The implications for antitrust law
are far too important to allow the case to be used as a test.
The majority's final word is based on the need for international com-
ity. The goal could best be fostered by refusing the arbitration of claims
with clear domestic policy implications. The signatories to the Conven-
tion expect no less, as the treaty expressly reserves this right to each
country.
146 See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
147 See generally Allison, supra note 34, at 274. Several states and some federal districts have
employed court-annexed arbitration with success.
148 See Mitsubishi Motors, 105 S. Ct. at 3368-69.
149 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
150 See Hoellering, supra note 143, at 2.




The decision in Mitsubishi is a landmark in United States case law.
There are several alternatives which the Court could have adopted in-
stead of applying a blanket rule of allowing arbitration of antitrust
claims.
Arbitration of antitrust claims could be made permissible only if an
arbitration clause is expressly included in the agreement.1 52 This rule
would be predictable, and would help to ensure that public policy is pro-
tected. The provision would be tied in with a requirement that a particu-
lar arbitrator be selected-one who would be familiar with United States
law and policy.153 Courts would need to guard against enforcing such
clauses against parties with little bargaining power.
Moreover, a different standard of judicial review and supervision
could apply to arbitrated awards of antitrust claims. The court could
provide that, where the domestic policy is not so strong as to invoke a
refusal to enforce under Article V of the Convention, a court may con-
duct an extensive review of the arbitration proceedings to ensure that the
substantial domestic policy interest is upheld by the arbitrator's decision
and that legal principles are followed. If there is an insufficient record of
the arbitral proceedings to allow for such review, the court may then
refuse to enforce the decision. This procedure could be amended to the
Federal Arbitration Act. This policy would ensure that only qualified
and competent arbitrators would hear important cases and that an ade-
quate record would be maintained.154 It is important to note that the
language of the Convention allows for such a refusal to arbitrate and for
the dispute to be sent to a special arbitral commission. 155
A common ground could be reached between the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Mitsubishi if more thorough judicial review of some
arbitration decisions were permitted and stricter record keeping require-
ments were employed. More effective judicial review would make the
Court's conclusion, that international arbitrators should be tested, more
reasonable.
Thus, the issue of arbitration of international antitrust suits could be
resolved by reading the Convention to allow broader review of arbitral
152 Parties to a contract are free to exclude statutory claims from arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors,
105 S. Ct. at 3355. The parties, of course, might not know what statutory claims may arise later.
153 It is often argued that arbitration removes the incentives for private enforcement of the law
when arbitrators fail to follow statutory provisions for the award of treble damages, attorney fees,
and the like.
154 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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decisions involving strong domestic public policy, as opposed to exclud-
ing such claims altogether. Such a reading would be justified by domes-
tic policy and would be in keeping with the spirit of the Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mitsubishi holding has produced a trend by the federal courts to
permit the arbitration of a wide variety of statutory claims. Numerous
federal courts have held that Mitsubishi requires arbitration of statutory
claims unless the statute evidences congressional intent to be exempt
from arbitration.156 Thus, several circuits have reinterpreted the Wilko
rule in light of Mitsubishi, compelling the arbitration of claims.157 Con-
sequently, although Mitsubishi did not directly address the issue of the
arbitrability of domestic antitrust or securities claims, the holding is far-
reaching. "Until Congress explicitly states its intent to bar arbitration in
certain statutory litigation, the court must adhere to the Mitsubishi rul-
ing and require arbitration."'158
The Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., enforcing an arbitration agreement between two
parties to an international commercial contract, is not in keeping with
the public policy of the United States. The Convention of the United
Nations and established case law allow for such a dispute to be kept from
the arbitral tribunals.
The United Nations Convention, as implemented by the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, provides for the refusal of recognizing and enforcing for-
eign arbitral awards if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of the party or the recognition
and enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
the country. As antitrust claims involve significant questions of public
policy, the United States has a particular interest in keeping these claims
from arbitration when there is no assurance of a competent, disinterested
arbitrator or an adequate record for judicial review. The presence of in-
ternational business concerns in the arbitration do not outweigh the im-
portance of this fundamental domestic policy.
A different standard of judicial review might be applied to awards of
antitrust damages. The courts might then allow arbitration of antitrust
claims if a clause expressly provides such review and the clause is not
156 See, e.g., Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D.Ga. 1985).
157 See, e.g., Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 626 F. Supp. 642 (D.Mass. 1985); Finkle & Ross v.
A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (C.D.N.Y. 1985); Intre Sport v. Kidder, Peabody
Customer's Agreement, 625 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
158 Ross, 624 F. Supp. at 117 n.9.
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part of an unconscionable contract. Until such a standard is adopted, it
is improper to allow the arbitration of antitrust claims in the interest of
international comity.
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